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 INTRODUCTION 
In the latest ―to be continued‖ in the story of the Doha 
Development Agenda (―DDA‖),1 Director-General Pascal Lamy 
suggested ―that Members wish to continue to explore any 
opportunities to gain the necessary traction and try to make tangible 
progress as soon as possible.‖2  This is a far cry from the earlier-
expressed goal of the Group of Twenty and World Trade 
Organization (―WTO‖) to complete the Round in 2011.3  The present 
slow-down is nothing new; the delegates of the WTO Members have 
maintained a dogged, albeit on-and-off, effort to complete the 
DDA‘s ambitious goals since the Round‘s inception in 2001.4  But 
the ebb and flow of the DDA‘s progress highlights the complexity of 
promoting economic development through reconciling the interests 
of nations across the economic spectrum.5  Juxtaposed between 
 
 1. Ved P. Nanda, Selected Aspects of International Trade and the World 
Trade Organization’s Doha Round: Overview and Introduction, 36 DENV. J. INT‘L 
L. & POL‘Y 255, 257–59 (2008) (explaining that the DDA, also known as the Doha 
Round, is a round of trade negotiations initiated in 2001 with a core objective of 
improving developing countries‘ trade prospects); see also The Doha Round, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2011). 
 2. Director-General Pascal Lamy‘s Statement, Report by the Chairman of the 
Trade Negotiations Committee, 1-2 May. 2012, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news12_e/gc_rpt_01may12_e.htm.   
 3. Group of Twenty, The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders‘ Declaration, ¶ 9 (Nov. 
11–12, 2010), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul.pdf; Trade 
Negotiations Comm., Lamy: ―The final countdown starts now‖, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/ news_e/news10_e/tnc_dg_ 
stat_30nov10_e.htm. 
 4. See Sungjoon Cho, Doha’s Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 165, 
165–67 (2007) (providing a brief history of the Doha Round); see also Nanda, 
supra note 1, at 255–56; Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish 
Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 1, 5–9 (2009) (citing 
multiple negotiation breakdowns over farm tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and 
quota protections as particularly contentious). 
 5. Cho, supra note 4, at 170-73 (discussing deadlocked negotiations arising 
from agricultural market issues). 
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criticisms as a rich nations‘ club on the one hand6 and attractiveness 
as an avenue for a greater share of the world‘s prosperity7 on the 
other, the WTO presents an opportunity for developing countries but 
also poses a challenge of grappling with the bargaining power of 
their developed trading partners.8   
In part to address this dilemma, the legal framework of 
international trade has provided a place for the special needs of 
developing countries since the inception of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (―GATT‖).9  Historically, developing countries 
have enjoyed special and differential treatment (―S&DT‖) 
purportedly commensurate with their ―development, financial, and 
trade needs.‖10  Yet, despite the fact that this phrase is employed in 
various places within the WTO‘s legal architecture,11 and lies at the 
heart of the test to determine the legality of S&DT granted to 
developing countries,12 the phrase has never been defined or given 
substantive elaboration in WTO covered agreements, adjudication, or 
scholarship.13   
 
 6. Id. at 165–66, 168–69. 
 7. JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLITICS, 
LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 170 (2006). 
 8. Id. at 170–71; Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After 
Sixty-Five Years: A Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 31, 62 (2008). 
 9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, 
TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE OTHER AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE 
IN GOODS 138-39 (2009) [hereinafter TRADE IN GOODS]. 
 10. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 3(c), L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1989) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]; TRADE IN 
GOODS, supra note 9 at 138-39; Peter Lichtenbaum, Reflections on the WTO Doha 
Ministerial: ―Special Treatment‖ vs. ―Equal Participation‖: Striking a Balance in 
the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1003, 1010-14 (2002). 
 11. See, e.g., TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, ¶ 3(c); see also GATT art. 
XXXVII: 4. 
 12. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 164, WT/DS246/AB/R 
(Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter AB Report]; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144-45. 
 13. Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, European Communities – Conditions 
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R, 
DSR 2004:III, 925), in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS‘ STUDIES ON 
WTO CASE LAW 790, 808-09 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007) 
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As a result of this lacuna in WTO law and policy guidance, S&DT 
granted to developing countries has typically been severely 
influenced by politically or special interest-motivated actors in 
developed countries.14  The typical vehicle for S&DT is the 
generalized system of preferences (―GSP‖),15 through which 
developed countries grant tariff concessions or zero-tariff market 
access to certain products originating in developing countries.16  For 
example, as described by Lance Compa and Jeffrey Vogt17 and 
echoed by Robert Howse,18 ―[t]he GSP is a centerpiece of U.S. trade 
policy,‖19 which as of 2010 provided ―duty-free entry for about 4,800 
products imported into the United States from 131 designated 
beneficiary countries and territories, including 44 least developed 
beneficiary countries so designated.‖20   
In practice, GSP provisions commonly incorporate conditionality 
whereby the tariff concession is tied to some requirement that the 
developing country must meet to receive the concession.21  Often 
included under the rubric of ―linkage,‖22 a term used to describe the 
 
[hereinafter ALI COMMENTARY]; Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the 
Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy 
of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 221, 252-53 (2007). 
 14. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147; Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The 
Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 126, 127–28 (2002); Robert Howse, 
India’s WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the European 
Community Generalized System of Preferences: A Little Known Case with Major 
Repercussions for ―Political‖ Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 
385 (2001) [hereinafter Howse, India’s WTO Challenge]; P. Trachtman, 
Institutional Linkage: Transcending ―Trade and . . .‖, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 77, 77-78 
(2002). 
 15. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 10, at 137-38. 
 16. JUAN C. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, THE GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 187 (2002). 
 17. Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of 
Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 199, 201 (2001). 
 18. Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra note 14, at 386. 
 19. Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 201. 
 20. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of 
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of the United States of America 1, 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.58/Rev.2 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. GSP Handbook], 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc58rev2_en.pdf. 
 21. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at  792-93; SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra 
note 17, at 220-25. 
 22. Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and Private 
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coupling of trade with non-trade issues,23 these conditions in the GSP 
have covered admirable issues such as the enforcement of 
internationally-recognized labor standards24 and environmental 
protection,25 but have extended to other linkages such as ―good 
governance‖26 and, as was the case under the former GSP scheme of 
the European Community (―E.C.‖), even a requirement that the 
developing country police drug trafficking in its borders.27   
This last GSP condition was the target of a challenge by India at 
the WTO‘s Dispute Settlement Body (―DSB‖).28 After an 
unsuccessful defense of this linkage to the ―development, financial, 
and trade needs‖ standard, the E.C. was forced to amend its GSP 
system.29  India‘s legal challenge was underpinned by concerns that 
 
Regulatory Approaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. 
INT‘L L. J. 203, 213–14 (2007); Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions 
at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 483, 535–36 (2007). 
 23. CHRISTIAN BARRY & SANJAY G. REDDY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
LABOR STANDARDS: A PROPOSAL FOR LINKAGE 3-5 (2008); Kolben, supra note 22, 
at 203; David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 5, 5–6 (2002). 
 24. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G)(1999) (presenting 
the U.S. GSP scheme conditioning preferential tariff treatment on ―internationally 
recognized worker rights‖); 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4) (1999) (defining ―internationally 
recognized worker rights‖); Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 202 (explaining that 
a country‘s GSP status is directly tied to a country‘s ability to provide for 
―internationally recognized workers rights‖). 
 25. Council Regulation 732/2008, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011 and 
Amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission 
Regulation EC No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007, art. 8, Annex III, Part B, 
2008 O.J. (L 211) 4, 5 (EC) [hereinafter EC GSP Plus]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Council Regulation 2501/2001, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff 
Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, arts. 10, 25, 
2001 O.J. (L346) 5, 8 (EC) [hereinafter EC 2001 GSP]. 
 28. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European Communities 
– Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter India Panel Request]; see also Request 
for Consultations by India, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/1 (Mar. 12, 2002); 
Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra note 14, at 386. 
 29. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 190-91; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 
145; Dionysia-Theodora Avgerinopoulou, Legislative Development, 
Implementation and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements — 
The New EC Generalized System of Preferences Scheme, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
828, 835–38 (2006). 
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the conditions upon access to the E.C. GSP program enabled 
Pakistan to gain preferential access to the E.C.‘s market by meeting a 
condition that India argued had little or nothing to do with economic 
development,30 not to mention the alleged $300 million that Indian 
exporters averred they were losing because of the condition.31  GSPs 
were meant to promote economic development,32 but by allowing 
developed countries the choice to grant S&DT to some developing 
countries and not others, those other eligible developing countries 
lose out on economic opportunity.33  While this sort of differentiation 
is permissible,34 it thwarts the development of any nation denied the 
S&DT and works to further the preference-granting country‘s 
interest if left completely at the whim of the preference-granting 
country.35  This is not only economically disadvantageous but, as 
determined by the Appellate Body (―AB‖), is also inconsistent with 
the WTO legal structure.36  For institutional reasons of the WTO and 
recipient nations‘ economic competitiveness, GSP linkages should 
conform to a legal standard even if they may simultaneously advance 
individualistic, social, and political agendas.37   
As articulated by the AB, the only WTO-consistent linkages in 
 
 30. Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 4.38, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) 
[hereinafter Panel Report]; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144; Amy Mason, 
Note, The Degeneralization of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): 
Questioning the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, 54 DUKE L.J. 513, 528 (2004). 
 31. Mason, supra note 30, at 515. 
 32. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 160 (―[T]he very purpose of the special and 
differential treatment permitted under the Enabling Clause is to foster economic 
development of developing countries.‖). 
 33. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147 (discussing trade diversion as a 
criticism of GSP conditionality). 
 34. See AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 156 (stating that preference-granting 
countries do not have to offer identical tariff preferences to all developing 
countries to be nondiscriminatory). 
 35. See ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 809; see also Debra P. Steger, 
Afterword: The ―Trade and . . .‖ Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
135, 138 (2002). 
 36. See AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163 (stating that ―[P]arargaph 3(c) does 
not authorize any kind of response to any claimed need of developing countries.‖). 
 37. See Steger, supra note 35, at 138 (positing that the WTO has solidified into 
a rules-based system despite originally being subject to typical treaty and contract 
interpretation principles). 
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GSPs are those that ―respond positively‖ to the beneficiary country‘s 
―development, financial, and trade needs‖38 (for convenience, 
―development needs‖).  There are at least two consequences of this 
legal requirement.  First, a GSP condition that fails to respond 
positively to a WTO-consistent ―development need‖ is in breach of 
Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause,39 which by its text requires 
this ―positive response‖40 and which, under EC–Tariff Preferences, 
calls for an objective development need.41  This objective 
―development need‖ could be determined by recourse to ―the WTO 
Agreement or multilateral instruments adopted by international 
organizations.‖42  Second, a developed country conditioning GSP on 
such a ―development need‖ must provide non-discriminatory 
standards by which a potential recipient developing country can 
demonstrate compliance with the condition and then grant the GSP to 
all developing countries that so demonstrate compliance; otherwise, 
the GSP condition would fail the requirement in Paragraph 2(a) of 
the Enabling Clause that GSP must be non-discriminatory.43   
The requirement that GSP linkages respond to development needs 
thus creates a great challenge to international trade policymakers 
 
 38. AB Report, supra note 12,  ¶¶ 160-65. 
 39. See Steve Charnovitz, A New WTO Paradigm for Trade and the 
Environment, 11 SING. Y.B. INT‘L L. 15, 22 (2007) (highlighting the example that 
―[i]f sustainable timber management is not considered a development need, then 
the Appellate Body‘s holding would seem to disallow that sort of environmental 
conditionality in a GSP programme.‖). 
 40. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(c); AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 179;  
ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 803. 
 41. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. ¶¶ 187–88; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 803-04, 809.  
There is the additional potential implication that a developed country that ignores a 
WTO-consistent development need would be held in breach of its obligation to 
offer GSP in a non-discriminatory manner as set forth in Paragraph 2(a) of the 
Enabling Clause.  To elaborate, suppose a developed country conditions tariff 
preferences on some undertaking X, identified as a development need.  A 
particular developing country may have no need to undertake X, but may as its 
own development need require a different undertaking, Y, also identified as a 
development need.  It would be costly for this developing country to undertake X 
and it instead must devote its resources to undertaking Y.  It is possible that the 
developing country could allege that the developed country is discriminating by 
granting tariff preferences based on X but not Y. 
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who must design or defend GSP schemes that aim to advance non-
trade policy goals.  For instance, labor rights linkage incorporated 
into a nation‘s GSP serves a laudable social goal.44  But in order to 
survive a challenge as to its consistency with WTO law, under the 
guidance provided in EC–Tariff Preferences, a nation conditioning 
trade preferences upon a labor rights linkage must demonstrate that 
promoting labor rights somehow responds positively to the recipient 
country‘s development needs.45  With the term ―development, 
financial, and trade needs‖ still undefined in WTO law, even eight 
years after EC–Tariff Preferences, the expansive question of what 
economic development objectives or requirements constitute 
―development needs‖ within the constructs of the WTO legal 
framework remains a tortuous knot in trade policy.46   
The ambiguity around the definition of ―development needs‖ 
creates challenges for both developing and developed countries as 
they consider GSPs.  For the developing country, this ambiguity 
allows special interest groups in developed countries to enjoy wide 
leeway in shaping GSPs according to individualistic agendas.  
Developing countries that choose not to comport with these 
individualistic agendas will lose out on market access to which they 
should be entitled in accordance with WTO commitments.47  For 
developed countries, the ambiguity means that meritorious human 
rights and social objectives that could be effectively achieved 
through GSPs may not enjoy the certainty of enforceability, or worse 
still, may falter under a challenge before the WTO DSB.48  To better 
coordinate the interests of developed and developing countries as 
trading partners, and in the interest of greater legal and policy 
certainty, it is necessary to articulate what is meant by ―development, 
financial, and trade needs.‖   
This article seeks to begin formulating what constitute 
―development, financial, and trade needs‖ within the legal 
framework of the WTO with the hope of contributing a measure of 
 
 44. Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 200. 
 45. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 803-04. 
 46. Id. at 808-10. 
 47. See SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 207-09. 
 48. See Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra note 14, at 387. 
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clarity to the linkage debate.49  Part I briefly reviews, as a backdrop 
to the discussion of ―development needs,‖ the negotiating role of 
developing countries through important rounds in the WTO‘s 
history, the nature of GSPs among leading developed entities in the 
international economic system, and the conditionality that GSPs 
typically include.  To provide the framework for a definition of 
―development needs,‖ Part II discusses the AB Report in EC–Tariff 
Preferences, the only case to elaborate upon the phrase 
―development, financial, and trade needs.‖50  This Part then briefly 
discusses the sources of law in the WTO framework that one would 
use to determine which economic development needs are consistent 
with WTO law.  Part III proceeds to articulate specific development 
needs that, in light of the standard from EC–Tariff Preferences and 
sources of WTO law, fall within the WTO‘s contemplation according 
to this article‘s argument.  Specifically, this Part discusses market 
access, poverty reduction, sustainable development, and education as 
WTO-consistent ―development needs.‖  
I. FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING LINKAGE AND 
―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖ 
A. ACCOMMODATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO 
The international trading order has evolved to accommodate, to an 
extent, the different international economic position of developing 
countries in relation to their developed trading partners.51  These 
institutional accommodations indicate WTO Members‘ recognition 
that the development needs of developing countries are distinct, as 
well as the WTO‘s goal as an institution to promote economic 
growth in light of these needs. The existing system of 
accommodations for developing countries thus serves as a backdrop 
against which to view the specific ―development needs.‖  
 
 49. See Steger, supra note 35, at 138-39 (supporting linkage through GSP 
while recognizing the limits of viewing the WTO as a contract subject to 
interpretation rather than a firm set of rules governing trade relations). 
 50. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144-45; Broude, supra note 13, at 253. 
 51. GATT, supra note 9, at 194; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 1; 
Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1007-09. 
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1. Initial Stages of the GATT 
Even during the earliest stages of the post-war trading evolution, 
nations realized that rules creating a level playing field irrespective 
of a country‘s level of economic development have the unintended 
effect of disadvantaging developing countries.52  While arguably 
appropriate as between two developed countries, a trade regime in 
which a less-developed country (―LDC‖) must compete by the same 
tariff structures as a developed country poses a significant challenge 
to the LDC.53  In the initial negotiations of the 1947 GATT, 
developing countries saw the benefits to trade and were willing to 
participate in the envisioned international trading system.54  
However, burdened by adverse terms of trade, they sought some 
degree of non-reciprocity and ability to protect their fledgling 
domestic industries.55  Developing countries were not, however, 
recognized as a distinct group in the 1947 GATT‘s drafting,56 and the 
only provision allowing for any special circumstances of developing 
countries was GATT Article XVIII, Governmental Assistance to 
Economic Development.57   
GATT Article XVIII, as originally drafted, was a mixed blessing 
for developing countries, containing certain special exceptions for 
these Contracting Parties but providing only limited access to these 
 
 52. AUTAR KRISHEN KOUL, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND GATT: ECONOMICS, LAW 
AND POLITICS 570 (2005) [hereinafter KOUL]; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 
137; Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential 
Treatment, Preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference, ¶ 1, 
WT/GC/W/442 (Sept. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Framework Agreement on S&DT]. 
 53. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137. 
 54. See BARTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 160 (explaining that developing 
countries‘ demands were addressed in Part IV of the GATT agreement). 
 55. KOUL, supra note 52, at 571. 
 56. BRIAN MCDONALD, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY ROUND 
AND BEYOND 49 (1998); Hunter Nottage, Trade and Development, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 481, 484 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. 
eds., 2009); see also Inaamul Haque, Doha Development Agenda: Recapturing the 
Momentum of Multilateralism and Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 
1097, 1107–08 (2002) (arguing that the original trading regime excluded 
developing countries from any meaningful participation). 
 57. GATT art.  XVIII; KOUL, supra note 52, at  571; Nottage, supra note 56, at 
485. 
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exceptions.58  It was not until the 1954-1955 GATT Review Sessions 
that developing countries received their first dedicated 
accommodation through an amended Article XVIII.59  Under this 
amendment, Article XVIII recognized that developing countries may 
need to adopt protectionist measures ―in order to implement 
programmes and policies of economic development designed to raise 
the general standard of living of their people,‖60 that the ―objectives 
of [the GATT] will be facilitated by the progressive development of 
their economies,‖61 and that protectionist measures for specific 
industries may be required to raise living standards.62  Most 
importantly, these measures were not derogations from GATT 
obligations; rather, they were part and parcel of the GATT 
framework for mutual cooperation.63   
While this specific provision in the GATT was not heavily utilized 
by developing countries, it opened the door for their more active 
participation in a way that accommodated their special needs and 
curbed their apprehensions of the GATT as a rich nations‘ club.64  In 
addition, even from its earliest phraseology, the goal of raising living 
standards, beyond the GATT‘s main purpose of market access, is 
woven into the text and indicates that the GATT‘s objectives will be 
advanced through the economic development of Contracting Parties 
with an eye to raising standards of living.65  
2. The Tokyo Round and The Enabling Clause 
Developing countries continued to negotiate for special and 
differential treatment up to and including the Kennedy Round in 
 
 58. KOUL, supra note 53, at 571 (noting that GATT Article XVIII requires less 
developed countries to negotiate meaningful tariff concessions to receive infant-
industry exceptions under the GATT). 
 59. Id. at 572; Nottage, supra note 57, at 485; Framework Agreement on 
S&DT, supra note 53, ¶ 3(a). 
 60. GATT art.  XVIII.2. 
 61. GATT art. XVIII.1. 
 62. GATT art. XVIII.3. 
 63. KOUL, supra note 52, at 572. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO Winners and Losers: The Trade and 
Development Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 165, 165 (2007); Chantal Thomas, 
Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2003). 
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1962-1967, and they achieved incremental victories along the way.66  
Notable among their victories was the creation of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (―UNCTAD‖) in 1964,67 a 
body that championed the cause of developing countries.68  
Specifically regarding provisions of the GATT, Articles XXXVI, 
XXXVII, and XXXVIII were added in 1965 to address developing 
countries‘ needs of expanded export earnings, product 
diversification, and joint action, respectively.69  These three 
provisions resonated most with the GATT‘s overarching objective of 
market access70 rather than internal development needs such as 
raising standards of living.  The most significant victory for 
developing countries and their S&DT agenda came in 1979 with the 
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,71 
popularly called the Enabling Clause.72   
The Enabling Clause was adopted at the end of the Tokyo Round 
and enshrined the principle of S&DT in the GATT framework.73  
Later adjudged by the AB to constitute a legal exception to the 
cornerstone GATT obligation of most-favored nation (―MFN‖) 
treatment,74 the Enabling Clause is recognized as the ―central pillar 
of S&DT in WTO law.‖75  The Enabling Clause allows developed 
Member States to provide better-than-MFN treatment to developing 
countries, and for developing countries to provide the same for one 
another so that developing countries may enjoy greater economic 
development.76  What started as a temporary measure pursuant to 
 
 66. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 140. 
 67. KOUL, supra note 52, at 574; Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra note 
52, ¶ 3(b). 
 68. KOUL, supra note 52, at 573. 
 69. Id.; GATT arts. XXXVI–XXXVIII; Framework Agreement on S&DT, 
supra note 52, ¶ 3(c). 
 70. KOUL, supra note 52, at 573–74; Nottage, supra note 56, at 485. 
 71. Enabling Clause, supra note 10; Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra 
note 52, ¶ 3(d). 
 72. KOUL, supra note 52, at 575; Nottage, supra note 56, at 485–86. 
 73. KOUL, supra note 52, at 575; Nottage, supra note 56, at 485–86. 
 74. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 98-103; see also GATT art. I.1; TRADE IN 
GOODS, supra note 9, at 137-38; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 802. 
 75. Nottage, supra note 56, at 486; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 90. 
 76. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137-38; KOUL, supra note 52, at 575; 
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UNCTAD Resolution 21(ii)77 later became a permanent provision of 
law among GATT Contracting Parties.78  In particular, the Enabling 
Clause allows for Generalized Systems of Preferences in order to 
promote the economic development of a less-developed country.79  
Initially intended to be a unilateral grant of preferential treatment by 
developed countries to their LDC trading partners, the Enabling 
Clause and its related trade benefits later evolved into a system in 
which developed countries would attach conditions to the 
preferential treatment.80   
3. Developing Countries’ Voice in the Uruguay Round and the 
Marrakesh Agreement 
The main emphasis of the Uruguay Round was to create a singular 
system with consistent application to all WTO members.81  To that 
end, and in light of experience with S&DT that was less favorable 
than expected,82 developing countries de-emphasized S&DT during 
the Uruguay Round in favor of a consistent, rule-based system and 
enhanced market access,83 and enjoyed a far more pronounced voice 
during those negotiations.84  Drawing some comfort from the dispute 
settlement mechanism established in the Marrakesh Agreement,85 
developing countries both gained and made concessions regarding 
market access while retaining recognition of their economic 
 
AB Report, supra note 12,  ¶ 166. 
 77. Expansion and Diversification of Exports of Manufacturers and Semi-
Manufacturers of Developing Countries, Resolution 21(II), Mar. 26, 1968, 
WT/DS246/R (2003). 
 78. Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶ 7.64; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137. 
 79. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 2(a);  McDonald, supra note 56, at 50. 
 80. See Gene Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The 
Law and Economics of GSP, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 255, 
257-58 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007) (highlighting a list 
of examples of conditions on preferential treatment, including conditions by the 
U.S. requiring that recipients do not have communist governments or support 
terrorism); see also AB Report, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 107-08. 
 81. McDonald, supra note 56, at 52. 
 82. Id.; Nottage, supra note 56, at 487. 
 83. Nottage, supra note 56, at 487-88. 
 84. McDonald, supra note 56, at 52; KOUL, supra note 52, at  579-81. 
 85. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
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development needs.86  Still, S&DT remained an integrated part of the 
WTO system after the Uruguay Round, but the form it took was 
largely that of allowing developing countries longer timeframes to 
implement uniform standards, rather than holding developing 
countries to different standards altogether.87  The special needs of 
developing countries remained encapsulated in various places in the 
relevant WTO agreements88 and Ministerial Declarations89 even if an 
articulation of the needs themselves has nowhere been codified.90   
4. The Doha ―Development Round‖ 
Some argue that the developing countries‘ more active voice in the 
Doha Round has caused this latest round of trade negotiations to 
reach such a seemingly insurmountable impasse.91  In the Doha 
Round, which commenced in 2001,92 the interests of developing 
countries have been appreciably more prominent.93  Reduction of 
agricultural subsidies by developed countries and non-agricultural 
market access (―NAMA‖) granted to developing countries 
constituted two of the most contentious issues in the Doha Round.94  
By early 2006, these had coalesced into a ―triangle‖ of issues, 
namely, agricultural subsidies, agricultural tariffs, and industrial 
tariffs.95  In order for the Doha Development Agenda to have 
succeeded at that stage, the U.S. would have had to reduce its 
agricultural subsidies, the E.U. would have had to reduce its 
 
 86. KOUL, supra note 52, at 579-80; McDonald, supra note 57, at 53. 
 87. Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1012–14; Framework Agreement on 
S&DT, supra note 52, ¶¶ 7, 9. 
 88. See, e.g., WTO Agreement pmbl.; GATT art. XVIII; see also KOUL, supra 
note 52, at 580. 
 89. See, e.g., World Trade Org., Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-
Developed Countries, ¶¶ 1, 3, 33 I.L.M. 1248 (1994); see also KOUL, supra note 
52, at 579. 
 90. Broude, supra note 13, at 252-53. 
 91. See Nanda, supra note 1, at 255-56. 
 92. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 93. Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transformations: The WTO as a Distributive 
Organization, 17 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2002) (discussing the WTO‘s 
increasing role in the distribution of wealth); Haque, supra note 56, at 1109; 
Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1024-25. 
 94. Cho, supra note 4, at 174-77. 
 95. Id. at 185. 
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agricultural tariffs, and developing countries, led by Brazil and India, 
would have had to decrease industrial tariffs.96  Such a compromise 
was never reached,97 and the Doha Round was suspended in July 
2006.98  Developing countries‘ voices were particularly more 
pronounced during the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong that 
was part of the Doha Round,99 and in large part because the Round 
highlighted the divergent interests of developed and developing 
countries, the Round has produced only tepid results.100  The 
developing countries left the Seattle Round prior to Doha with a 
unified agenda,101 brought this agenda to the Doha Round,102 and 
have stood fast that they will not let another round of negotiations 
pass without their interests being heard, even if it means an 
impasse.103  It calls to mind a characterization of India‘s Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath at the July 2008 Ministerial 
Meeting—a trade official remarked that Mr. Nath ―just sat there and 
said ‗No‘ for 12 straight hours.‖104   
While agricultural subsidies and NAMA were the more headline-
grabbing issues raised by developing countries, the text of the Doha 
Development Agenda includes a call for a substantial review of 
S&DT in light of the Framework Agreement on Special and 
Differential Treatment proposed by Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (―Framework Agreement‖).105  
The DDA echoes the Framework Agreement‘s urging for a review of 
all S&DT provisions ―with a view to strengthening them and making 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 186-87. 
 98. Id. at 165.  Trade Negotiation Comm., DG Lamy: time out needed to review 
options and positions, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 24, 2006), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_24july06_e.htm. 
 99. Cho, supra note 4, at 180-81. 
 100. Id. at 183; Nanda, supra note 1, at 261–64. 
 101. Cho, supra note 4,  at 168-69. 
 102. Id. at 169-70. 
 103. Id. at 165. 
 104. Bhala, supra note 4, at 120; John W. Miller, Indian Minister Frustrates 
West at Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A6. 
 105. Doha Declaration, supra note 92, ¶ 44; Framework Agreement on S&DT, 
supra note 52. 
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them more precise, effective, and operational.‖106  In particular, the 
Framework Agreement calls for ―the establishment of a concrete and 
binding [S&DT] regime which is responsive to the development 
needs of the developing countries.‖107  The Framework Agreement 
includes the following among the desired elements of this S&DT 
regime:  
(1) mandatory and binding S&DT through the WTO dispute 
settlement system,  
(2) a reconciliation of the S&DT regime with development 
targets, for instance, those identified by the United Nations 
General Assembly Millennium Declaration,108  
(3) implementation costs of the S&DT regime,  
(4) transition periods linked to objective economic and social 
criteria,  
(5) no prohibitions on growth and development in developing 
countries, and  
(6) non-automatic application of the concept of a single 
undertaking, as contemplated in the Uruguay Round.109   
Thus, the Framework Agreement reaffirms the developing 
countries‘ stance that their position in the international trading order 
is notably different, their legal obligations should be accordingly 
adjusted, and the adjustment should be commensurate with their 
development needs. 
5. Synthesis: Incorporating Development in the WTO as an 
Institution 
The negotiating history of the WTO framework shows a 
progressively greater role played by developing countries.  While by 
 
 106. Doha Declaration, supra note 92, ¶ 44; Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 
1028-29; Nanda, supra note 1, at 259. 
 107. Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra note 52, ¶ 10. 
 108. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶¶ 11-23, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 109. Framework Agreement on S&DT, supra note 52, ¶ 15. 
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no means a sideline player even in the earliest stages, they enjoyed 
growing prominence as the timeline moved towards the present and 
an undeniable influence in the Doha Round.  The goals of developing 
countries remain at best partly fulfilled by the WTO system despite 
deliberate and overt attempts to accommodate such goals through 
S&DT and various other provisions outlining rights and obligations 
in the WTO legal framework.  But while practice, economic theory, 
and rhetoric have all elucidated some of what constitutes developing 
countries‘ ―development needs,‖ as referenced in the relevant 
provisions in WTO law, the legal basis for identifying specific needs 
as falling under the rubric of this term remains to be set forth.   
B. GSPS AND CONDITIONALITY 
This article submits that greater coherence to GSPs, as a widely 
used form of S&DT, will represent a step towards achieving the 
Doha Development Agenda‘s goal to make S&DT more ―precise, 
effective, and operational.‖110  This increased coherence can be 
achieved through defining the ―development needs‖ to which GSP 
conditionality must respond111 in light of S&DT‘s goal of promoting 
economic development.112  Before reviewing the WTO law and 
interpretative elements that may be used to define ―development 
needs,‖ this article will briefly discuss GSPs and the linkages they 
typically involve, as well as two points regarding this article‘s 
argument in light of the legal standard with which GSP linkage must 
comport.   
1. GSPs in Developed Countries’ Municipal Laws 
By agreement of the GATT Contracting Parties, GSP is a 
mechanism through which developed countries can assist developing 
countries in their economic development by granting them tariff 
treatment that is better than the MFN treatment they must afford to 
their developed trading partners.113  There are presently thirteen 
national or regional GSP schemes reported to the UNCTAD 
 
 110. Doha Declaration, supra note 92, ¶ 44. 
 111. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 163-64; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 
803. 
 112. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 160-61. 
 113. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 137-38. 
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Secretariat,114 among which the largest are offered by the United 
States, European Community (―E.C.‖), and Japan as preference-
granting WTO Members.115   
Broadly speaking, the U.S. GSP affords duty-free access to 
products that are eligible for GSP treatment, come from a designated 
beneficiary country, and comport with the GSP rules of origin.116  
The value of imports for an eligible product, however, is capped by 
the competitive need limitation (―CNL‖) for that product, and, if the 
cap is exceeded in a given year, the beneficiary country loses GSP-
eligibility for that product in the following year.117   
Somewhat similar to the U.S. scheme, Japan offers a general 
preferential tariff for the importation of industrial and agricultural 
goods.118  This scheme allows for duty-free import in some cases,119 
subject to quantitative ceilings by product120 and an escape clause 
allowing suspension of GSP treatment for a product if it causes or 
threatens to cause domestic market disruption.121   
The E.C.‘s scheme is more variegated, with eligible products 
satisfying the rules of origin receiving different preferential rates, a 
feature that replaces quantitative caps on GSP imports.122  Under the 
 
 114. About GSP, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2011) (identifying the thirteen countries that currently present GSP 
schemes: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the European Union, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and 
the United States). 
 115. Rolland, supra note 22, at 536; SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 237, 
239, 242, 244 (analyzing the size and impact of GSP schemes in various nations 
including Switzerland, Japan, the United States, and Canada). 
 116. US GSP Handbook, supra note 20, at 7. 
 117. Id. at 17 (defining CNLs as limitations on preferential treatment for items 
that a beneficiary nation already exports competitively). 
 118. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of 
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of Japan 9–10, UNCTAD/ITCD/ 
TSB/Misc.42/Rev.3 (2006) [hereinafter Japan GSP Handbook], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc42rev3_en.pdf. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 10. 
 121. Id. at 11; SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 196. 
 122. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Generalized System of 
Preferences: Handbook on the Scheme of the European Community viii, 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.25/Rev.3 (2008) [hereinafter EC GSP Handbook], 
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E.C.‘s GSP program, beneficiary countries are then eligible for 
additional tariff reductions, termed ―special incentives,‖ in 
accordance with the E.C.‘s ―GSP Plus‖ and its conditionality upon 
the beneficiary country adopting certain international treaties.123   
Two salient factors adding complexity to GSP schemes are 
―graduation‖ clauses and conditionality.124  Graduation clauses allow 
a preference granting country to exclude a beneficiary country from 
GSP treatment when the beneficiary country has achieved a degree 
of economic development.125  Conditionality in GSP schemes allows 
preference-granting countries to vary or suspend GSP benefits 
depending on policies adopted by the beneficiary country.126  
Because the AB‘s exploration of GSP focused on linkage, which in 
turn gave rise to the legal requirement that GSP linkage must be 
reconciled with ―development needs,‖ this article will highlight this 
aspect of GSP. 
2. Linkages Employed in GSP 
Under the overarching rubric of promoting development through 
GSP, linkage is a permissible facet to the GSP scheme.127  Linkage in 
GSP arises when preferential tariff rates or duty-free access granted 
to a beneficiary country are conditioned on the adoption of certain 
domestic policies by the beneficiary country.128  These domestic 
 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsbmisc25rev3_en.pdf. 
 123. Id. at viii-ix, xi; EC GSP Plus, supra note 25, art. 8, Annex III. 
 124. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 202. 
 125. EC GSP Handbook, supra note 122, at  viii; Japan GSP Handbook, supra 
note 119, at 11; U.S. GSP Handbook, supra note 20, at 17, 56; see also Trade Act 
of 1947, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(e) (1994). There is disagreement as to whether WTO 
law governs the decision as to whether a developing country is an eligible 
developing country under a GSP scheme, separate from whether a linkage 
employed by the GSP scheme upon such eligible developing countries is valid, or 
is instead a matter of domestic political determination.  Compare Broude, supra 
note 14, at 255-58 and Kelé Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: 
Emanations from the European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY‘S L.J. 
425, 458–59 (1995), with Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and 
Preferences: Developing Countries and the Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30 
N.C. J. INT‘ L. & COM. REG. 515, 555-56 (2005). 
 126. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 200. 
 127. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 162; Howse, India’s WTO Challenge, supra 
note 14, at 395-96. 
 128. Kyle Bagwell et al., It’s a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
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policies run the gamut, from political, to commercial, to social, to 
human rights.129  Under the U.S. GSP scheme, for instance, ―[t]he 
President shall not designate any country a beneficiary developing 
country‖ eligible for GSP treatment if the country aids or abets any 
group that has committed any act of international terrorism,130 fails to 
act in good faith in recognizing or enforcing arbitral awards rendered 
in favor of U.S. citizens,131 or takes no steps ―to afford internationally 
recognized worker rights to workers in the country.‖132  The term 
―internationally recognized worker rights‖ is defined to include the 
right of association, the right to collective bargaining, the prohibition 
of forced labor, prohibition of child labor, and acceptable working 
conditions with respect to minimum wages, working hours, and 
safety conditions.133   
In the E.C.‘s GSP Plus, ―special incentive‖ tariff treatment is 
conditioned on ―sustainable development and good governance,‖ 
requiring the beneficiary country to have ―ratified and effectively 
implemented all the conventions listed in Annex III.‖134  These 
conventions include international human rights instruments such as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(―ICCPR‖);135 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (―ICESCR‖);136 and Convention Against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;137 
International Labour Organization conventions including the 
Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
 
56, 71-72 (2002) [hereinafter Market Access]; Kolben, supra note 22, at 213-14. 
 129. See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 130. Trade Act of 1947, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(F) (1999). 
 131. Id. § (b)(2)(E). 
 132. Id. § (b)(2)(G); R. Michael Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational 
Enterprises and International Labor Standards: Which Way for Development and 
Jobs?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141, 148 
(Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996). 
 133. Trade Act of 1947, 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4) (1999). 
 134. EC GSP Plus, supra note 25, art. 8. 
 135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 136. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 137. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art.1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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the Right to Organise (No. 87)138 and the Convention Concerning the 
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargain 
Collectively (No. 98);139 and environmental conventions such as the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.140  
Notably, the E.C. has maintained the linkage to combating illicit 
drug trafficking, the same conditionality that was invalidated by the 
AB,141 only cloaking it in the requirement that the beneficiary 
country ratify and implement the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,142 
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances,143 and 
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.144 
Taking a step back, this article recalls that India‘s original 
argument at the inception of EC – Tariff Preferences was that GSP 
was meant to apply to all developing countries in a fully 
nondiscriminatory manner and that no conditionality was permitted 
under the Enabling Clause.145  The Panel ruled in India‘s favor on 
this point,146 but the Appellate Body curtailed the ruling to still allow 
GSP conditionality so long as it responded positively to development 
needs.147  While not ignoring the obvious economic motivation for 
 
 138. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise (No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ILO 
Convention No. 87]. 
 139. Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), Jan. 7, 
1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98]. 
 140. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
 141. See EC 2001 GSP, supra note 27, arts. 10, 25; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 
190(g). 
 142. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 82/16, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 
(1988) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Traffic in Drugs]. 
 143. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 2, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 
U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976). 
 144. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 
1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964) [hereinafter Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs]. 
 145. Panel Report, supra note 30,  ¶¶ 4.10–4.11, 4.28; Howse, India’s WTO 
Challenge, supra note 14, at 387; Mason, supra note 30, at 528-29. 
 146. Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶ 7.116; Mason, supra note 30, at 531. 
 147. AB Report, supra note 12,  ¶ 165; ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 
803-04; Mason, supra note 30, at 533–34; see also Howse, India’s WTO 
Challenge, supra note 14, at 393-95. 
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India‘s request for a panel,148 India‘s challenge points to a broader 
criticism that GSP linkage has a trade-diverting effect whereby the 
gain of one developing country is the economic loss of another 
developing country.149  This may be an acceptable systemic cost that 
results in a Pareto improvement if social justice objectives can be 
achieved through GSP linkage, though it is worth observing that the 
market experience with GSP and linkage has been something of a 
mixed bag.150   
Beyond that, however, it is not that simply any social justice 
objective can be roped into the GSP scheme; rather, only those 
conditions that ultimately advance a ―development need‖ are 
permissible.151  Developing countries already faced challenges in 
coordinating their side of the GSP bargain because of the complexity 
and variability in GSP schemes.152  Without question, the vagaries of 
GSP, driven not only by the lobby-motivated conditionality but also 
through annual review and revision thereof,153 can frustrate even the 
most sophisticated exporters in developing countries.154  Moreover, 
they thwart the social goals that GSP linkage aims to achieve.155  To 
add to this labyrinthine policy coordination obstacle course, the outer 
bounds of ―development needs‖ remain an elusive mystery.156   
 
 148. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147; Mason, supra note 30, at 515 
(explaining that the E.C. scheme costs Indian exporters $300 million per year). 
 149. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147.  To crystallize this point, one can 
imagine a scenario where $300 million of trade is shifted entirely from one 
developing country to another.  Contrast this with a scenario in which the $300 
million is shared between the two developing countries.  The two developing 
countries would both take from this $300 million in preferential trade as they 
together approached the ceiling or CNL of the preference granting country. 
 150. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 252, 262; Compa & Vogt, supra note 
17, at 237-38; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 146-47. 
 151. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 808. 
 152. Kolben, supra note 22, at 214-16; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 147; 
Lichtenbaum, supra note 10, at 1015-16. 
 153. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 216-20. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Compa & Vogt, supra note 17, at 237-38. 
 156. ALI COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 808; Broude, supra note 13, at 252. 
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C. THE NEXUS BETWEEN GSPS AND ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖—
THE LINK IN LINKAGE 
1. A Required Legal Reconciliation, even if not the Motivation, of 
Linkage 
In light of the legal standard that GSP linkage must advance 
―development needs,‖ this article presents two brief clarifications as 
to its argument.  The first clarification is that while the nexus 
between GSP and ―development needs‖ is a legal reconciliation 
required under WTO law,157 by no means would advancement of 
―development needs‖ have to be the motivation behind the GSP 
linkage.  Professor Petros Mavroidis points out that even in the wake 
of EC – Tariff Preferences, ―[i]t is at best debatable whether the 
donors have incentives to adopt criteria that will promote 
development of the recipients and not simply their own social 
preferences which might upset the prioritization of development 
options for the recipients.‖158  This claim is not here disputed.159  But 
to be clear, the constraint imposed under WTO law is that the linkage 
must incentivize some undertaking by the beneficiary country that is 
a ―development need.‖  In the words of the AB, ―a sufficient nexus 
should exist between, on the one hand, the preferential treatment . . . 
and, on the other hand, the likelihood of alleviating the relevant 
‗development, financial [or] trade need.‘‖160  So long as the linkage 
can be tied back to a relevant development need, however, the 
original motivation of the linkage may come from any source.   
2. Enabling the Enabling Clause to Serve Human Rights and Social 
Goals 
The second clarification is that this article offers a set of 
parameters whereby human rights and social goals can be advanced 
through a WTO mechanism, i.e., GSP linkage, and can be 
legitimized under WTO law through the Enabling Clause.  
 
 157. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 164. 
 158. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 145. 
 159. See id. at 145 (noting diverging views which include the argument that 
developed countries may adopt GSP conditions precisely to advance the 
development of the recipient country). 
 160. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 164. 
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Advocates have sought to use the powerful enforcement capabilities 
of the WTO to promote social justice objectives in developing 
countries, sometimes arguing that these objectives are permissible 
under GATT Article XX‘s exceptions,161 and sometimes arguing for 
outright social clause inclusions in the covered agreements.162  GSP 
linkage is not only prevalent in the international trading 
community,163 but is also regarded as a viable means of advancing 
social justice objectives through a WTO mechanism.164  Thus social 
justice advocates seeking to (a) advance human rights objectives not 
presently covered through GSP linkage, or (b) defend existing 
linkages, may promote and protect their laudable objectives by 
preparing legal arguments demonstrating a nexus between the GSP 
condition and an economic development need.   
This article‘s goal is to begin an enumeration of WTO-consistent 
―development needs‖ to help in the preparation of these arguments.  
Thus, this article reviews the principal WTO AB Report articulating 
a standard by which one may determine ―development needs,‖ and 
presents other sources of WTO law that may be used to show that 
these needs comport with the WTO framework.   
II. SOURCES OF LAW FROM WHICH TO 
DETERMINE ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖ 
A. THE EC – TARIFF PREFERENCES APPELLATE BODY REPORT 
In WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions, the concept of 
―development needs‖ has come up only twice in any level of 
 
 161. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate 
of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 94, 102 (2002) (explaining 
the challenges in arguing legality under the GATT of a U.S. trade embargo against 
tuna fished in a manner that harmed dolphins and the problem of applying 
domestic policy to import restrictions). 
 162. See Virginia Leary, The WTO and the Social Clause: Post-Singapore, 1 
EUR. J. INT‘L L. 118, 118–19 (1997) (discussing negotiations over a social clause 
from a historical perspective). 
 163. SÁNCHEZ ARNAU, supra note 16, at 234-35. 
 164. Market Access, supra note 128, at 71-72; Gadbaw & Medwig, supra note 
132, at 148; see also Terry Collingsworth, International Worker Rights 
Enforcement?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
227, 229–33 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996). 
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appreciable detail.165  In Brazil – Export Financing Programme for 
Aircraft, the Panel found that ―it is the developing country Member 
itself which is best positioned to identify its development needs.‖166  
EC – Tariff Preferences was the principal case that articulated the 
standard for discerning development needs and forms the starting 
point for the analysis of such needs.167  This article will review the 
arguments and holding in that case. 
1. India’s Legal Challenge to the European Communities’ GSP 
In December 2002, India questioned the legality of the GSP 
adopted by the European Communities and, in particular, the tariff 
preferences it granted to specified developing countries that 
combated drug production and trafficking (―Drug Arrangements‖) 
and that upheld labor and environmental standards determined by the 
E.C. 168  India had been a beneficiary of preferential treatment from 
the E.C. until the adoption of the E.C.‘s GSP scheme in December 
2001.169  This scheme designated Pakistan as a recipient of a special 
arrangement in exchange for combating drug production and 
trafficking, but excluded India,170 and thus, the GSP threatened to put 
Indian goods at a competitive disadvantage in the E.C. market.171  
Additionally, it was not at all clear that the Drug Arrangements, 
 
 165. Broude, supra note 13, at 253 (noting that Brazil – Export and EC – Tariff 
Preferences were the only instances in which the Panel or Appellate Body has 
spoken to ―development needs‖). 
 166. Panel Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
WT/DS46/R p. 104 (Apr. 14, 1999). The Appellate Body left the finding 
unaddressed, speaking instead to the burden of proof issue regarding the developed 
country that challenges a developing country‘s measure as inconsistent with its 
development needs.  Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme 
for Aircraft, ¶¶ 89-94 WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); see also Broude, supra note 
13, at 253. 
 167. Broude, supra note 13, at 253; TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 143-45. 
 168. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by India, European Communities–
Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
WT/DS246/4 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter India Panel Request]. 
 169. EC 2001 GSP, supra note 27; see also AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 1. 
 170. EC 2001 GSP, supra note 27, at 15-17. 
 171. Anastasios Tomazos, The GSP Fallacy: A Critique of the Appellate Body’s 
Ruling in the GSP Case on Legal, Economic, and Political/Systemic Grounds, in 
WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 306, 307 (George A. Bermann & Petros 
C. Mavroidis eds., 2007); TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 144. 
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environmental protection requirement, or labor standards 
specification bore any relation to the economic development needs of 
LDCs.172  India challenged the E.C.‘s GSP in relation to Enabling 
Clause paragraph 2(a), which authorizes GSP schemes, paragraph 
3(a), which stipulates that GSPs must not create undue difficulties 
for the trade of a contracting party that is not the recipient of the 
preference, and paragraph 3(c), which requires that the GSP must be 
designed ―to respond positively to the development, financial and 
trade needs of developing countries.‖173   
2. The Appellate Body’s Ruling 
The AB first held that the ―object and purpose‖ of the Enabling 
Clause was to promote the economic development of WTO Members 
who were developing countries.174  While the GATT Article I:1 
imposes the obligation of most-favored nation treatment upon all 
WTO Members, the Enabling Clause operates as a legal exception to 
that obligation.175  Furthermore, Members have an international legal 
right within the WTO system to grant preferential treatment to 
LDCs;176 indeed, developed Members are encouraged to provide this 
preferential treatment.177  The AB noted that preferential treatment to 
LDCs is facially inconsistent with the MFN obligation of GATT 
Article I:1, but that the treatment can nonetheless be legally justified 
by virtue of the Enabling Clause.178  Thus, in order for preferential 
treatment to be legal under the WTO, the treatment must comply 
with the Enabling Clause‘s requirements.179   
 
 172. Robert Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle?  Almost but not Quite 
Yet: India’s Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the 
European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 
1333, 1339-40 (2003). 
 173. India Panel Request, supra note 168; AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 2-4.  At 
a later point, India dropped the challenges to the environmental and labor 
standards, pursuing only the challenge to the Drug Arrangements.  AB Report, 
supra note 12, ¶ 4. 
 174. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 92. 
 175. Id. ¶¶ 90, 98-99. 
 176. Id. ¶¶ 101-02. 
 177. Id. ¶ 111. 
 178. Id. ¶¶ 101-02. 
 179. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 111-12. 
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3. The Standard for Compliance with the Enabling Clause 
The Appellate Body articulated four substantive requirements for 
compliance with the Enabling Clause.180  First, the preferences must 
not impair Members‘ ability to uphold their otherwise-applicable 
MFN obligations.181  Second, the treatment must not ―raise barriers to 
or create undue difficulty for‖ the trade of a non-recipient 
Member.182  Third, the preferential treatment must be ―generalized, 
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory.‖183  Finally, the preferential 
treatment must ―respond positively to the development, financial and 
trade needs of developing countries.‖184  The Appellate Body did not 
elaborate upon the first of these requirements, stemming from 
paragraph 3(b) of the Enabling Clause.  As to the second, arising 
from paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body 
stated that the preferential treatment to LDCs must ―not impose 
unjustifiable burdens on other Members.‖185  Ultimately finding the 
Drug Arrangements in the E.C.‘s GSP to be inconsistent with the 
Enabling Clause because this GSP linkage was discriminatory,186 the 
AB explored the remaining two standards in depth.   
a. Generalized, Non-Discriminatory, and Non-Reciprocal 
Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause allows for GSP schemes, 
but footnote 3 to this paragraph imposes the legal obligation that the 
GSP scheme be ―generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory.‖187  The term ―generalized‖ requires that ―the GSP 
schemes of preference-granting countries remain generally 
 
 180. Id. ¶ 112.  This article presents the requirements articulated in ¶ 112 of the 
AB Report in slightly different order than that in the AB Report for convenience of 
presentation. 
 181. Id. ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(b). 
 182. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(a). 
 183. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 2(a), 
n.3. 
 184. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 112; Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(c). 
 185. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 167, 179. 
 186. Id. ¶¶ 187-89. 
 187. Id. ¶¶ 112, 131, 145 (stating that ―only preferential tariff treatment that is in 
conformity with the description ‗generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory‘ treatment can be justified under paragraph 2(a)‖). 
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applicable.‖188  The Appellate Body did not elaborate on the term 
―non-reciprocal,‖ but in line with other provisions within the GATT, 
non-reciprocal can be interpreted to mean that ―the developed 
contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made 
by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.‖189  LDCs 
should not be required to give trade preferences to developed 
countries in exchange for treatment under GSP schemes.190  Finally, 
the term ―non-discriminatory‖ means that, while different treatment 
may be granted to different LDCs or groups of LDCs,191 in light of 
paragraph 3(c), the recipient LDCs must share a development need 
and any LDC that has the same development need must be able to 
avail itself of the GSP treatment.192   
b. Paragraph 3(c): Development, Financial, and Trade Needs 
The remaining legal obligation of the Enabling Clause is the one 
stemming from paragraph 3(c), the requirement that any preferential 
treatment ―be designed, and, if necessary, modified, to respond 
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of 
developing countries.‖193  While the Panel made no finding as to the 
consistency of the Drug Arrangements with paragraph 3(c), the 
Appellate Body elaborated upon this standard for purposes of 
determining the nature of the requirement that the E.C.‘s GSP 
scheme be non-discriminatory.194   
Because the object and purpose of the Enabling Clause is to 
promote economic development, the ―development needs‖ falling 
under paragraph 3(c) must similarly be needs of economic 
development.195  Preferential treatment responds positively to these 
needs if it has the effect of ―improving the development, financial or 
 
 188. Id. ¶ 156. 
 189. GATT  art. XXXVI(8); TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 141. 
 190. See TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 141. 
 191. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 159. 
 192. Id. ¶¶ 157, 159-62, 165. 
 193. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 3(c); see also AB Report, supra note 12, 
¶¶ 112, 158. 
 194. See AB Report, supra note 12,¶¶ 130, 133, 157. 
 195. Id. ¶¶ 92, 160. 
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trade situation of a beneficiary country, based on the particular need 
at issue.‖196  A need does not qualify as a development need simply 
because it is identified this way by the preference-granting Member 
or beneficiary.197  By contrast, ―the existence of a ‗development, 
financial [or] trade need‘ must be assessed according to an objective 
standard,‖198 whereby qualifying development needs are those that 
are ―widely-recognized.‖199  In order to determine these development 
needs, the AB directs WTO Members to look to ―broad-based 
recognition of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in 
multilateral instruments adopted by international organizations.‖200  
The Appellate Body did not address key areas of the definition of 
―development needs‖ necessary to be workable guidance: what 
specifically qualifies as valid, widely-recognized economic 
development needs and which multilateral instruments were suitable 
for use in determining broad-based recognition.   
B. BEYOND EC – TARIFF PREFERENCES: SOURCES OF WTO LAW  
While heavily persuasive, WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports 
are not strictly a source of WTO Members‘ rights and obligations; 
rather, these rights and obligations derive from the agreements listed 
in Appendix 1 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (―DSU‖, and such agreements, 
the ―Covered Agreements‖) and interpretative elements.201  The 
WTO is best understood as a creation of international contract, 
whereby principles of applicable law are selectively chosen and 
given relevance in the Covered Agreements.202  Some principles of 
international custom may not find their way into the WTO, while 
 
 196. Id. ¶ 164 (emphasis in original). 
 197. Id. ¶ 163. 
 198. Id. ¶ 163 (emphasis in original). 
 199. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 179. 
 200. Id. ¶ 163. 
 201. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 23 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Matsushita et al.]; see, e.g., 
Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO 
Courts, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 421, 426 (2008) [hereinafter Mavroidis] (listing 
various interpretive elements including GATT panel reports, decisions by 
international courts, and customary international law). 
 202. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 22-23. 
 
2012] DEFINING ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖ 67 
 
other binding principles, for instance, the treatment of the most-
favored nation principle in WTO law and Members‘ practice, may 
apply in the WTO even though they do not enjoy sufficient 
widespread state practice and supporting opinio juris to give them 
the status of custom.203  However, the WTO Agreement is not an 
exhaustive, self-contained treaty creating a completely isolated 
institution, but rather, is best thought of as an incomplete contract.204   
As a result, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism must 
determine the rights and obligations of Members with occasional 
reference to elements of international law outside of the WTO 
system.205  These and other sources that have aided the dispute 
settlement bodies in understanding the precise meaning and scope of 
the rights and obligations under WTO law constitute the 
interpretative elements in WTO adjudication.206  While the 
fundamental rights and obligations are codified in the WTO 
Agreement, the interpretation of its provisions often involves 
recourse to external sources, within limits.207  The outer bound of 
what is applicable to interpreting Member States‘ rights and 
obligations is set forth in Article 3(2) of the DSU.208  Specifically, 
this provides that the Dispute Settlement Body (―DSB‖) must 
interpret Member States‘ rights and obligations ―in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.‖209  
These interpretative elements thus do not create additional rights and 
obligations upon Members under WTO law, nor can the rights and 
obligations embodied in non-WTO multilateral agreements be 
 
 203. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 23; see also Military and Paramilitary 
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 184-89 (June 27) (describing 
widespread state practice and supporting opinio juris as the elements of customary 
international law). 
 204. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 23. 
 205. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163; see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 
450-51. 
 206. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 426. 
 207. Id. at 426. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; see also 
Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 426. 
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enforced through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.210  
Instead, these outside sources are means of determining the nature of 
rights and obligations that derive from sources within the WTO 
Covered Agreements.211   
1. Sources of Rights and Obligations under WTO Law 
The underlying rights and obligations of WTO Member States are 
found exclusively in the Covered Agreements.212  Beginning with the 
WTO Agreement itself, Appendix 1 of the DSU goes on to list the 
agreements mentioned in the Annexes of the WTO Agreement.213  In 
addition to these agreements-proper, there are international 
agreements that are incorporated into the Covered Agreements and 
also give rise to rights and obligations for WTO Member States.214  
Of specific relevance to this discussion are decisions adopted by 
GATT Contracting Parties prior to the WTO; these are specifically 
incorporated into the WTO Agreement by Article XVI.1.215  In 
particular, the Enabling Clause is a decision of the GATT 
Contracting Parties.216  The Appellate Body specifically recognized 
the Enabling Clause as among the Covered Agreements, providing 
rights to developed countries to offer trade preferences and a 
corresponding obligation ―to establish in dispute settlement the 
consistency of their preferential measures with the conditions of the 
Enabling Clause.‖217   
2. Interpretative Elements to Determine Contours of WTO Rights 
and Obligations 
The requirement that rights and obligations of WTO Member 
States must be carried out in accordance with ―the customary rules of 
 
 210. DSU, supra note 209, art. 3.2; Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 426. 
 211. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 425. 
 212. DSU, supra note 209, art. 3.2 ( stating that ― Members recognize that [the 
dispute settlement system of the WTO] serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements . . .‖); Mavroidis, supra 
note 201, at 427. 
 213. DSU, supra note 209, art. 1; WTO Agreement app. 1. 
 214. Matsushita et al., supra note 201, at 25. 
 215. GATT art. XVI(1). 
 216. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, pmbl. 
 217. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 98. 
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interpretation of public international law‖218 has been found to 
include the General Rule of Interpretation embodied in Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.219  This includes, 
among other things, that rights and obligations under a treaty must be 
interpreted based on the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty 
itself in their context,220 in light of the treaty‘s object and purpose,221 
and with regard to subsequent agreements and state practice on the 
same subject matter.222  In EC – Tariff Preferences, the Appellate 
Body looked to the preamble of the WTO Agreement to determine 
the instrument‘s object and purpose.223  This is consistent with Panel 
and AB reports that have looked to the GATT‘s preamble, with the 
limitation on teleological interpretation that it must be mindful of the 
ends sought by the treaty as well as the means to achieving the 
ends.224  As to subsequent state practice, the weight of authority is 
that only unanimous practice by all WTO Member States qualifies as 
an interpretative element.225   
As with the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖),226 there is no 
rule of stare decisis in the WTO dispute settlement system, and no 
WTO Panel or Appellate Body is formally bound by past reports.227  
However, also like the ICJ,228 WTO dispute settlement entities look 
 
 218. DSU, supra note 209, art. 3(2). 
 219. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 15, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. – Gasoline] (quoting a previous 
panel report on a WTO case to interpret key language); Mavroidis, supra note 202, 
at 444; Jan Bohanes & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 378, 387 (Daniel Bethlehem 
et al. eds., 2009). 
 220. Vienna Convention, supra note 219, art. 31(1). 
 221. Vienna Convention, supra note 219, art. 31(1). 
 222. Vienna Convention, supra note 219, art. 31(3); see also Mavroidis, supra 
note 201, at 444. 
 223. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 91-92. 
 224. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 452. 
 225. Id. at 453. 
 226. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1153, 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 227. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 464. 
 228. See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 13, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter 
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to past DSB reports as an interpretative element.229  The Appellate 
Body, in U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–Malaysia), affirmed that past 
DSB reports are relevant to a Panel or Appellate Body ―as a tool for 
its own reasoning.‖230  The Panel in India – Patents (EC) stated that 
while Panels are not bound by previous panel or Appellate Body 
decisions, they will take into account the conclusions and reasoning 
of past decisions because of the DSU‘s goal of providing 
predictability to the multilateral trading system and avoiding 
inconsistent DSB rulings.231   
The WTO AB and Panels have, when necessary, looked to 
agreements outside of the WTO-proper in interpreting the standards 
of WTO law.232  The Appellate Body in U.S. – Shrimp sought 
recourse to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species233 to determine whether the species of sea turtles in question 
fell within the meaning of the term ―exhaustible natural resources‖ as 
it appears in GATT Article XX(g).234  In a later stage of the same 
dispute, the Appellate Body used non-WTO international agreements 
to ascertain evidence of practice that may or may not be consistent 
with obligations arising from a Covered Agreement.235  In yet 
 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages] (―[ICJ Statute Article 59] has not inhibited the 
development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which 
considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible.‖); 
see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 464. 
 229. Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 464. 
 230. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse by Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 
109, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Nov. 21, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–
Malaysia)]; see also Mavroidis, supra note 202, at 464. 
 231. Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 7.30, WT/DS79/R (Sept. 22, 1998); see also 
Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 465-66; Bohanes & Lockhart, supra note 219, at 
382. 
 232. See Mavroidis, supra note 202, at 468. 
 233. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 I.L.M. 1085 
(1973). 
 234. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 132, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter 
U.S. – Shrimp]; Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 468-69. 
 235. U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–Malaysia), supra note 235, ¶ 124 (finding that, 
by reference to multilateral environmental agreements, ―a multilateral approach is 
strongly preferred.  Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the 
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another dispute, the Appellate Body sought recourse to multilateral 
instruments in order to ascertain a factual state of affairs.236  
Additionally, the Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preferences 
indicated that ―the existence of ‗development, financial [or] trade 
need‘ must be assessed according to an objective standard‖237 and 
that ―[b]road based recognition of a particular need, set out in the 
WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments adopted by 
international organizations, could serve as such a standard.‖238   
Finally, multilateral instruments are important to finding the 
living, dynamic meaning of treaty terms ―in light of contemporary 
concerns of the community of nations.‖239  Treaty terms written 
decades ago must be interpreted in the light of the treaty‘s object and 
purpose, but that same object and purpose can contemplate a long-
term vision so that the substantive nature of terms and their 
definitions can grow and evolve with time.240  The same can be said 
about ―development needs,‖ and, consequently, the Appellate Body 
opened the door to multilateral instruments as the basis for the 
objective standard to determine the evolving content of this term.241   
C. SYNTHESIS: A LIVING, EVOLVING STANDARD FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS 
The Appellate Body elucidated that development needs must be 
economic in nature, in light of the Enabling Clause‘s object and 
purpose, and that a goal may qualify as a ―development need‖ by 
reference to the Covered Agreements and other multilateral 
 
application of a measure that is provisionally justified under one of the 
subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994; it is another to require the 
conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding ―arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination‖ under the chapeau of Article XX.‖) (emphasis in 
original); see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 468. 
 236. Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶¶ 114, 135, WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter 
EC – Measures]; see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 469. 
 237. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163 (emphasis in original). 
 238. Id. 
 239. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 234, ¶ 129. 
 240. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 160, 169; see also U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 
234, ¶¶ 129, 131. 
 241. See id. ¶ 163. 
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instruments.  A textual basis in a specific article from a Covered 
Agreement delineating a WTO Member‘s right or obligation 
provides perhaps the strongest basis in law for a goal to be deemed a 
―development need,‖ but in the view of the AB, ―development 
needs‖ may also take on a living, evolving character through 
interpretative elements outside of the Covered Agreements.  As other 
multilateral instruments and other interpretative elements have 
served as sources by which to understand WTO Members‘ rights and 
obligations in the past, they are equally valid in the analysis of 
―development needs.‖  In light of the above sources of law, and as 
further informed by the practice of WTO Members, this article 
proceeds to delineate specific ―development needs.‖   
III.ANALYSIS OF ―DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL, 
AND TRADE NEEDS‖ 
A. RELEVANT ATTRIBUTES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
To begin, the term ―economic development‖ is itself seldom 
defined in economics discourse.  When a definition of the term is 
proffered, economists, scholars, and policymakers tend to include 
macroeconomic growth,242 wealth creation and increased per capita 
income,243 industrialization and production of higher-quality or more 
sophisticated goods,244 and sustainability245 as attributes of economic 
development.  Professor Alan Deardorff specifically defines 
―economic development‖ to mean the ―[s]ustained increase in the 
economic standard of living of a country‘s population, normally 
accomplished by increasing its stocks of physical and human capital 
and improving its technology.‖246  Professor Gerald Meier defined it 
as ―the process whereby the real per capita income of a country 
increases over a long period of time—subject to the stipulations that 
 
 242. JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES M. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 31 (3d ed. 2009) (1997). 
 243. Id. at 31. 
 244. Id.; EDWARD J. BLAKELY & NANCEY GREEN LEIGH, PLANNING LOCAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (4th ed. 2010). 
 245. Douglas Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic 
Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22–28 (2001). 
 246.  ALAN V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMICS 79 (2006) (emphasis in original). 
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the number below an ‗absolute poverty line‘ does not increase, and 
that the distribution of income does not become more unequal.‖247  
This article makes the extension that a ―development need,‖ 
something needed to attain economic development, can consequently 
be defined as an undertaking, process, input, objective, or policy 
required to achieve one or several goals of economic development.248  
From this starting point, this article proceeds to argue that 
macroeconomic growth, poverty reduction, sustainability, and 
education are ―development needs‖ consistent with the WTO legal 
framework.249 
 
 247. Gerald M. Meier, Objectives of Development–Note, in LEADING ISSUES IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5, 5-6 (4th ed. 1984). 
 248. The definition proffered herein is simply based on parsing the phrase 
―development needs‖ into ―things needed for development.‖  The specific 
contributors to economic development articulated herein, not meant to be an 
exhaustive list, are based on economics discourse.  For instance, as undertakings or 
processes that contribute to economic development, economists have included 
improving technology or techniques of production, John P. Lewis, Development 
Promotion: A Time for Regrouping, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED 
3, 9–10 (John P. Lewis & Valeriana Kallab eds., 1986); Meier, supra note 247, at 
6, and improved infrastructure, M.K. Datar, Development Banking: Is it the End?, 
in CHALLENGES TO INDIAN BANKING: COMPETITION, GLOBALISATION AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 229, 231 (Narendra Jadhav ed., 1996).  Development 
economists have identified labor productivity, ALAN S. BLINDER, GROWING 
TOGETHER 50–67 (1991), and the availability of financing/credit, Datar, 
Development Banking, supra note 249, at 231, as inputs that contribute to 
economic development.  An objective of economic development could include, 
simply, an economic growth target, for instance through increased productive 
output or new industries.  Meier, supra note 247, at 6.  A policy of poverty 
reduction to increase disposable income has been identified as contributing to 
economic development as distinguished from simply economic growth.  Meier, 
supra note 247, at 7-8; Irma Adelman, A Poverty-Focused Approach to 
Development Policy, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED 49, 54-56 
(John P. Lewis & Valeriana Kallab eds., 1986); Montek S. Ahluwalia, Income 
Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem, in REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH 3, 
3 (Hollis Chenery et al. eds., 1974). This article‘s goal is to take certain 
contributors to economic development that are well-recognized in the economics 
discourse and reconcile these contributors with WTO legal text and interpretative 
elements. 
 249. This article focuses on these four development needs, again meant to be 
indicative rather than exhaustive.  Additionally, this article notes that these needs 
relate to actions that the government of the developing country can choose to 
engage in.  There is a separate category of needs that are based on the 
circumstances in which a developing country finds itself, for instance, a low 
literacy rate, or even more separated from social factors, low access to rainfall 
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B. THE ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖ CONSISTENT WITH WTO LAW 
1. Macroeconomic Growth as a Development Need 
The initial impetus for creating the GATT, and an objective 
maintained as the GATT transformed into the WTO,250 was to further 
the goal of providing Contracting Parties with access to one 
another‘s markets.251  This access was to be provided through trade 
market liberalization, taking down barriers to trade, and eliminating 
discriminatory treatment.252  The goal of providing market access 
remained a motivation of later trade negotiation rounds addressing 
non-tariff barriers and voluntary export restraints.253  While market 
access, as a goal of developed countries, serves the goal of economic 
growth for already-established economic powers,254 the evolution of 
the GATT as it progressed towards the WTO saw a greater voice for 
developing countries and their concerns of market access.255  Having 
accepted to a sufficient degree that trade liberalization can lead to 
economic growth,256 developing countries advocated enhanced 
flexibility to export their economically significant goods to 
developed markets.257  Correspondingly, developed countries 
 
giving rise to economic challenges.  The latter category of needs may constitute 
needs for assistance, but not factors or undertakings necessary to achieve economic 
development.  The factors or undertakings necessary for economic development, 
including policy undertakings, are the focus of this article‘s definition of the 
―development needs‖ which this article argues can be the subject of GSP 
conditionality. 
 250. WTO Agreement art. II.1, Annex I. 
 251. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
10 (2005); see also Market Access, supra note 128, at 59; see also KOUL, supra 
note 53, at 9. 
 252. GATT pmbl. 
 253. KOUL, supra note 52, at 19, 23-24. 
 254. Id. at 20-21. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions under the WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 12, 19 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007); KOUL, 
supra note 52, at 569. 
 257. Kessie, supra note 256, at 21.  Kessie notes that at the time of the Uruguay 
Round, developing countries were willing to accept a dilution of special and 
differential treatment in exchange for greater market access and stricter rules.  Id. 
at 20.  In light of subsequent experience, the majority of developing countries now 
view special and differential treatment as having had a favorable effect on their 
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undertook to protect the interests of developing countries when the 
GATT was assumed into the WTO Agreement and as the WTO 
Agreement later evolved.258   
From the decisions of GATT Contracting Parties leading up to the 
WTO and in the WTO Agreement itself, macroeconomic growth, 
and in particular that of developing countries, has been a founding 
principle and recognized goal of the international trading system.259  
The GATT Preamble expresses the agreement‘s goal of ―expanding 
the production and exchange of goods.‖260  The WTO broadens this 
to enshrine the goal of ―expanding the production of and trade in 
goods and services.‖261  The ―cornerstone principle‖ of MFN 
treatment is itself most fundamentally aimed at advancing mutual 
market access.262  In the development of S&DT, the original decision 
of the GATT Contracting Parties that allowed for GSPs, the Waiver 
Decision on the Generalized System of Preferences,263 affirms that ―a 
principal aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is promotion of the trade 
and export earnings of developing countries for the furtherance of 
their economic development.‖264  This was to be achieved in a 
collaborative manner between developed and developing 
countries,265 and in light of the development need to achieve 
macroeconomic growth, this article submits that measures promoting 
the goal of increased market access advance a ―development need‖ 
that is consistent with the WTO legal regime.266   
 
economic development.  Id. at 34. 
 258. Kessie, supra note 256, at 27-30. 
 259. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 110; see also Broude, supra note 13, at 236. 
 260. GATT pmbl. 
 261. WTO Agreement pmbl.;  AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 161, 168. 
 262. AB Report, supra note 12,  ¶ 101; Sam Laird, Multilateral Approaches to 
Market Access Negotiations, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN 
REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 205, 205 (Miguel Rodríguez 
Mendoza et al. eds., 1999); TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 122. 
 263. GATT Document L/3545, June 25, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 
24 [hereinafter Waiver Decision]. 
 264. Waiver Decision, supra note 263, pmbl.; see also AB Report, supra note 
12, ¶ 92. 
 265. See GATT art. XXXVI:1(d). 
 266. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 107; see also WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE 
POLICY AND GLOBAL POVERTY 41–42 (2004) (pointing to empirical economic 
evidence indicating that export growth is associated with increased growth in 
GDP). 
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2. Raising Standards of Living as a Development Need 
Based on sources of international law both within the WTO 
system and from other multilateral treaties, this article proceeds to 
argue that the goal of raising standards of living is equally as widely-
recognized as a need of developing countries.  Economic theory, 
outside of the context of international and WTO law-proper, has 
consistently championed poverty reduction as a bedrock goal of 
economic development.267  Furthermore, the practice of states and 
international institutions has borne out this development goal in both 
domestic and international settings.268  This article submits that 
poverty reduction is a development need in line with the WTO goal 
of raising living standards, and presents both the economic and legal 
bases for this submission.   
Of the four development needs discussed herein, poverty reduction 
may be the most challenging to argue as falling within the WTO‘s 
contemplation.  It is consistent with the construction of the WTO to 
say that the WTO legal framework contemplates the objective of 
raising living standards.269  In order to proceed and argue that this 
implies and includes poverty reduction, however, this article 
analyzes this development need from the perspectives of 
international law and economics.  This article‘s assertion that poverty 
 
 267. Montek S. Ahluwalia & Hollis Chenery, The Economic Framework, in 
REDISTRIBUTION WITH GROWTH 38, 38–39 (Hollis Chenery et al. eds., 1974);  
Montek S. Ahluwalia, The Scope for Policy Intervention, in REDISTRIBUTION WITH 
GROWTH 73, 73 (Hollis Chenery et al. eds., 1974); Meier, supra note 247, at 7;  see 
also Cline, supra note 266, at 28 (stating that ―sustained economic growth in 
developing countries is essential to the reduction of global poverty‖). 
 268.  With regard to the practice of states, see, for example, Maurizio Bussolo et 
al., Structural Change and Poverty Reduction in Brazil: The Impact of the Doha 
Round, in POVERTY AND THE WTO: IMPACTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 249, 250–53 (Thomas W. Hertel & L. Alan Winters eds., 2006) 
(examining the impact of trade on the reduction of poverty in the Brazilian 
agricultural sector).  In regard to the practice of international institutions, see, for 
example, James D. Wolfensohn, A Partnership for Development and Peace, in A 
CASE FOR AID: BUILDING A CONSENSUS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 3, 7-8 
(World Bank 2002); Frank J. Garcia, Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions, and 
the Problem of Inequality, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM 475, 493-95 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (outlining 
several World Bank initiatives aimed at ―reduc[ing] poverty while improving 
health, education, and the environment‖). 
 269. See infra notes 288-322 and accompanying text. 
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reduction is a ―development need‖ should not be taken as an 
argument that the WTO as an institution should positively channel its 
machinery towards the goal of poverty reduction.  Rather, this article 
submits that if a developed Member were to promote, or incentivize 
developing countries to take steps towards this goal, or provide trade 
preferences that responded positively to this need among developing 
countries, the developed Member would be within its rights to offer 
preferential treatment so designed.270   
a. Poverty Reduction: Analysis in International Economics 
From the definitions of economic development presented above,271 
the sub-goals of poverty reduction and income redistribution emerge 
as essential to economic development as distinguished from solely 
broad-based economic growth.272  In addition to overall 
macroeconomic growth, the distribution of the returns from that 
growth is jointly a goal of economic development.273  In the present-
day formulation, economic development is viewed to be 
inadequately achieved if the returns accrue only to the select few and 
the impoverished remain without those returns.274  For instance, an 
economy that includes both an indigenous or agricultural sector and a 
modern, industrial, or service sector may experience aggregate 
growth with all of the returns accruing to the modern sector; this is 
an inequitable distribution and does not satisfy the requirement of 
economic development even if it registers as macroeconomic 
growth.275   
Poverty reduction is a goal of economic development as widely 
recognized as increasing overall macroeconomic production.276  
Moreover, just as economic development aims to reduce poverty, 
 
 270. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 271. See supra Part III.A. 
 272. Meier, supra note 247, at 6-7. 
 273. Ahluwalia & Chenery, Economic Framework, supra note 267, at 38-39. 
 274. Wolfensohn, supra note 268, at 7-8. 
 275. Meier, supra note 247, at 7. 
 276. PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: 
THEORY AND POLICY 602-03 (7th ed. 2005); Meier, supra note 247, at 7; S. 
Vasudeva Shetty, Re-inventing Rural Banking, in CHALLENGES TO INDIAN 
BANKING: COMPETITION, GLOBALISATION AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 61, 74–75 
(Narendra Jadhav ed., 2d ed. 1996). 
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poverty reduction depends on economic growth.277  In order for 
poverty reduction to accrue from macroeconomic growth, there must 
be mechanisms for distributing national income evenly across socio-
economic sectors of the population.278  Thus, income redistribution 
has taken its place as a fundamental and essential component of 
successful economic development.279   
Increased per-capita income alone does not reflect income 
distribution; by contrast, empirical economic analysis indicates a 
greater level of inequality between the wealthy and poor of the world 
despite increases in per-capita income.  As an illustration, the World 
Bank‘s measure of poverty in developing and transition economies, 
the percentage of the population living below $1 per day, fell from 
28.3 percent in 1987 to 24.0 percent in 1998.280  World Bank survey 
data indicate that for every 1 percent increase in per-capita income, 
the poverty measure should fall by 2 percent if income is distributed 
according to expectations.281  With real per-capita income growth in 
the developing and transition economies averaging 2 percent 
annually between 1987 and 1998, the poverty measure should have 
fallen to as low as 18.4 percent by 1998.282  This disparity between 
the expected and actual results can be explained, in part, by increased 
inequality in the distribution of the gains from economic growth that 
was seen in relatively higher-poverty economies including Brazil, 
China, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria.283   
 
 277.  Cline, supra note 266, at 27.  The proposition in this context, that 
economic growth is essential to poverty reduction, begs the related question of 
whether international trade leads to economic growth.  While outside of the scope 
of this article, Cline observes that data indicates a causal relationship between 
international trade and economic growth.  Id. at 40-42, 45. 
 278. Ahluwalia, supra note 267, at 73; see also Cline, supra note 266, at 28. 
 279. See, e.g., Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Dual Income Taxation:  A 
Potentially Promising Approach to Tax Reform in Developing Countries, 1 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 151, 214–15 (2010) (arguing for a progressive tax scheme in 
developing countries to promote sustained growth by redistributing income and 
reducing inequality in the distribution of gains from economic growth). 
 280. Cline, supra note 266, at 28. 
 281. Id. at 27. 
 282. Id. at 28-29. 
 283. Id. at 29, 35.  The author mentions potential World Bank data inadequacies 
and a series of studies indicating that the reduction in poverty was greater than the 
data captured.  While agreeing that the status of poverty may be more optimistic 
than the World Bank‘s study alone indicates there is still an amount of poverty that 
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This article makes the extension, based on this economic theory 
and practice, that poverty reduction is a natural corollary to the goal 
of raising living standards, and recalls that in economic practice, this 
has taken place through domestic income redistributive measures.284  
Income redistribution allows for improvements in the standard of 
living on a national level across the wealth spectrum of the nation‘s 
population.285  Moreover, as this article argues below with regard to 
agreements between the WTO and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (―World Bank‖), this extension is 
not inconsistent with the WTO Agreement:286 the World Bank‘s 
goals in practice have gone as far as to actively promote income 
redistribution to alleviate poverty.287  This article submits that 
domestic or international measures that raise living standards and 
reduce poverty by redistributing national income thus advance an 
internationally-recognized development need.  And as this article 
proceeds to argue, such measures advance a ―development need‖ that 
is consistent with WTO law. 
b. Poverty Reduction: Analysis in International Law 
Alongside promoting increased national income through 
macroeconomic growth, a sibling goal in the WTO legal order is to 
improve the living standards of individuals within a Member State.288  
The AB cites, in relation to S&DT adopted pursuant to the Enabling 
Clause, Paragraph 7 of that instrument.289  Paragraph 7 of the 
 
should have disappeared.  Id. at 29-31.  Income inequality remains an independent 
explanation even correcting for potential data inadequacies.  Id. at 33. 
 284. SEE GORDON TULLOCK, ECONOMICS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 1-3 
(1983) (pointing to income redistributive measures to benefit the poor while 
acknowledging that, more generally, a greater proportion of redistributive 
measures in the U.S. historically has been a manifestation of influential groups 
exerting established political clout). 
 285. Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income Distribution and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social 
Development, 6 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (1996). 
 286. See WTO Agreement art. III.5 (drawing a connection between the WTO 
and World Bank); see also Gardner, supra note 8, at 67 (noting the World Bank‘s 
contributions to international development). 
 287. Carrasco & Kose, supra note 285, at 41. 
 288. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 107; see also GATT art. XXXVI:1(a), (d). 
 289. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 168; see also id. ¶ 161 (observing that ―the 
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Enabling Clause expressly states:  
The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by 
developed and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of 
the [GATT] should promote the basic objectives of the [GATT], including 
those embodied in the Preamble and in Article XXXVI.290 
This article thus begins with a review of the GATT 
Preamble and Article XXXVI. 
The goal of raising living standards is stated in the preamble of the 
GATT,291 and the WTO Agreement carries this goal forward, 
augmenting it to include a ―steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand.‖292  Both the GATT and WTO Agreement 
additionally include the goal of ―ensuring full employment‖ as a 
founding principle.293  Moreover, the decisions of the Panel and AB 
have reaffirmed the goal of raising living standards as part of the 
WTO legal order.  As recently as 2008, the Panel in India – 
Additional and Extra-Additional Duties bolstered its interpretation of 
GATT Article II:1(b) by observing the consistency of its 
interpretation with the object and purpose of the GATT.294  In 
particular, it cited the goals of ―raising standards of living‖ and 
―expanding the production and exchange of goods‖ as integral to the 
GATT‘s object and purpose.295   
The goal of raising living standards is also enshrined in the text of 
GATT Article XXXVI, a provision that appears in Part IV of the 
GATT (Trade and Development).296  Part IV of the GATT contains 
 
Preamble to the WTO Agreement . . . informs all the covered agreements including 
the GATT 1994 (and, hence, the Enabling Clause)‖). 
 290. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, ¶ 7; see also Gregory O. Lunt, Note, 
Graduation and the GATT: The Problem of the NICs, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L 
L. 611, 618 n.44 (1994). 
 291. GATT pmbl. 
 292. WTO Agreement pmbl. 
 293. GATT pmbl.; WTO Agreement pmbl.; see also AB Report, supra note 12, 
¶ 161. 
 294. Panel Report, India – Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports 
from the United States, ¶ 7.142, WT/DS360/1 (June 9, 2008) [hereinafter India – 
Additional Duties on Imports]. 
 295. India – Additional Duties on Imports, supra note 294. 
 296. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a). 
 
2012] DEFINING ―DEVELOPMENT NEEDS‖ 81 
 
three provisions: Article XXXVI sets forth the objectives that will 
guide developed members in their trade relations and negotiations 
with less-developed members; Article XXXVII contains 
commitments to further these objectives; and Article XXXVIII calls 
on Contracting Parties to take joint action in furtherance of Article 
XXXVI‘s objectives.297  The commitments contained in Article 
XXXVII have been described as undertakings by developed 
countries to engage in their ―best endeavor‖ and, hence, are non-
binding in nature.298  But by virtue of Articles XXXVI and XXXVII, 
the Contracting Parties have agreed that when developed contracting 
parties engage in activities pursuant to the commitments in Article 
XXXVII:1, they do so in furtherance of the objectives contained in 
Article XXXVI.299  By way of express reference, Article 
XXXVII:2(b)(i) provides that if ―effect is not being given to any of 
the provisions of subparagraph (a), (b) or (c) of [Article 
XXXVII:1] . . . [t]he CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested so to 
do by any interested contracting party . . . consult with the 
contracting party concerned and all interested contracting parties 
with respect to the matter and with a view to reaching solutions 
satisfactory to all contracting parties concerned in order to further the 
objectives set forth in Article XXXVI.‖300  Article XXXVIII further 
provides that ―[t]he contracting parties shall collaborate jointly, with 
the framework of this Agreement and elsewhere as appropriate, to 
further the objectives set forth in Article XXXVI.‖301   
The very first objective articulated in Article XXXVI:1 is ―the 
raising of standards of living,‖302 an objective to be ―give[n] effect‖ 
through the ―adoption of measures‖ as a matter of ―conscious and 
purposeful effort on the part of the contracting parties both 
 
 297. GATT arts. XXXVI–XXXVIII; Uché Ewelukwa, Special and Differential 
Treatment in International Trade Law: A Concept in Search of Content, 29 N.D. L. 
REV. 831, 846–47 (2003). 
 298. Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT‘L 
& COMP. L. REV. 291, 311 (2004); see also Ewelukwa, supra note 297, at 847. 
 299. GATT arts. XXXVI, XXXVII; Ewelukwa, supra note 297, at 846–47. 
 300. GATT art. XXXVII:2(b)(i). 
 301. GATT art. XXXVIII; M. Richard Komins, Technical Analysis of the Group 
―Framework‖, 12 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 299, 310 (1980). 
 302. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a). 
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individually and jointly.‖303  The Contracting Parties agreed that 
―[t]here is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that the less-
developed contracting parties secure a share in the grown in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development.‖304  Article XXXVI:1 observes that ―export earnings of 
the less-developed contracting parties can play a vital part in their 
economic development and that the extent of this contribution 
depends on . . . the volume of their exports, and the prices received 
for these exports.‖305  The provision additionally notes, however, that 
―there is a wide gap between standards of living in less-developed 
countries and in other countries‖306 and that ―the basic objectives of 
this Agreement include the raising of standards of living and the 
progressive development of the economies of all contracting 
parties.‖307  The provision goes on to observe that this objective ―is 
particularly urgent for less-developed contracting parties.‖308   
According to this article, GATT Article XXXVI is the clearest 
codification of the concept that raising standards of living is a 
―development need‖ that may be given effect through S&DT and 
other ―positive efforts‖ by WTO Members.  From its founding to its 
recent efforts, the international trading system has advanced the idea 
that the benefits from trade should accrue to those in need of these 
benefits.309  Article XXXVI:1(a) recalls that raising living standards 
is among the ―basic objectives‖ of the GATT.310  A policy that 
champions this goal thus promotes a development need that is within 
the contemplation of the WTO.   
Additional review of the GATT provisions further reveals 
dedicated treatment of the goal of raising living standards and, in 
 
 303. GATT art. XXXVI:9. 
 304. GATT art. XXXVI:3. 
 305. GATT art. XXXVI:1(b). 
 306. GATT art. XXXVI:1(c). 
 307. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a). 
 308. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a). 
 309. TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 9, at 138–44; Gardner, supra note 8, at 62; see 
also Press Release, World Trade Org., Free Trade Helps Reduce Poverty, Says 
New WTO Secretariat Study (Jun. 13, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm #fn1(pointing to more recent activity of the 
WTO advancing the goal of channeling trade benefits towards poverty reduction). 
 310. GATT art. XXXVI:1(a). 
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particular, those of less-developed countries.  The Contracting 
Parties recognized that channeling the benefits of trade and economic 
development to the especially impoverished Members is most 
consistent with the object and purpose of the GATT.311  Article 
XVIII:1 recognizes that ―the attainment of the objectives of this 
Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of 
their economies, particularly those contracting parties the economies 
of which can only support low standards of living and are in the early 
stages of development.‖312  This provision indicates that less 
developed countries may be granted special attention in the 
GATT/WTO system; subsequent provisions in Article XVIII grant 
LDCs a greater degree of leeway in promoting their development 
while remaining in keeping with their GATT obligations.313  For 
instance, Article XVIII:2 provides that ―those contracting parties,‖314 
i.e., ―those contracting parties the economies of which can only 
support low standards of living,‖315 may take protectionist measures 
―in order to implement programmes and policies of economic 
development designed to raise the general standard of living of their 
people, [] take protective or other measures affecting imports, and 
that such measures are justified in so far as they facilitate the 
attainment of the objectives of [the GATT].‖316  The remainder of 
Article XVIII lays out measures these contracting parties may take 
towards the attainment of these objectives and, in particular, to raise 
the general standard of living of their people.317  Commentators have 
treated the phrase ―low standards of living‖ in Article XVIII as 
equivalent to poverty.318  Thus, this article submits that GATT 
Article XVIII:2 provides textual support for the claim that ―raising 
standards of living‖ as used in the Covered Agreements incorporates 
 
 311. See GATT art. XVIII:1; see also Raj Bhala, Mercy for the Third World 
Through GATT Article XVIII, 6 SING. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 498, 503–04 (2002). 
 312. GATT art. XVIII:1. 
 313. KOUL, supra note 52, at 281. 
 314. GATT art. XVIII:2. 
 315. GATT art. XVIII:1. 
 316. GATT art. XVIII:2. 
 317. GATT art. XVIII:4(a), (b).  See generally id. Sections A–D. 
 318. Steve Charnovitz, International Trade & Developing Countries, 29 
FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 259, 259 (2006); Bhala, supra note 313, at 503, 539; see 
generally id. (discussing GATT Article XVIII section by section in full detail). 
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―poverty reduction‖ as used in economics discourse.319 
Beyond the Covered Agreements themselves, the Appellate Body 
additionally pointed to multilateral instruments adopted by 
international organizations in order to determine, objectively, what 
constitutes a development need of LDCs.320  Here as well, one need 
not journey too far before the goals of raising living standards and 
reducing poverty become evident in the international instruments.  
GATT Article XXXVI:6 recognizes the need for collaboration 
between the Contracting Parties and ―the international lending 
agencies.‖321  The WTO Agreement expressly recognizes the World 
Bank in this regard,322 making the Agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (―World Bank 
Agreement‖)323 a valid interpretative element.324  One of the 
fundamental purposes of the World Bank is ―to promote the long 
range balanced growth of international trade . . . thereby assisting in 
raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of 
labour.‖325  The practice of the World Bank has commonly 
interpreted this provision to include, and indeed, center on, poverty 
reduction.326  From this standpoint in particular, the development 
 
 319. See R.S. Pathak, International Trade and Environmental Development: A 
View From India, 1 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1994) (―Upon 
attaining independence, the new States realized that, among other things, poverty 
and low standards of living at home led to comparatively weaker bargaining 
positions in the arenas of international diplomacy and international economic 
opportunity.  The development of national identities made those countries desire 
urgent development and modernization, improved conditions of living for their 
people, and a more equitable place in the comity of nations.‖); Burns H. Weston, 
Basic Human Needs: The International Law Connection: Remarks by the 
Chairman, 72 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 224, 226 (1978) (―The poorest people are 
in those countries which have the lowest per capita income, the lowest growth rate, 
and, paradoxically, the greatest degree of equality—a degree of equality imposed 
precisely by the miserably low standards of living of those overall.‖). 
 320. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163. 
 321. GATT art. XXXVI:7. 
 322. WTO Agreement art. III:5. 
 323. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended Dec. 16, 
1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294 [hereinafter World Bank Agreement]. 
 324. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163; see also Mavroidis, supra note 201, at 
472-73. 
 325. World Bank Agreement, supra note 325, art. 1(iii). 
 326. Carrasco & Kose, supra note 285, at 41. 
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needs of raising the standards of living and redistributing income so 
as to alleviate poverty are deeply intertwined.   
GATT Article XXXVI:7 calls for collaboration between the 
Contracting Parties and ―other intergovernmental bodies and the 
organs and agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities 
relate to the trade and economic development of less-developed 
countries.‖327  The United Nations Charter, in Article 55, sets forth 
this goal of raising living standards as a founding principle of the 
post-war international legal order.328  Later, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (―ICESCR‖) 
reaffirmed this goal.329  Article 11(2) of the ICESCR recognizes ―the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger‖ and Article 
7(a)(ii) recognizes ―the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just 
and favorable conditions of work which ensure, in particular, . . . 
remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with . . . a 
decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the 
provisions of [the ICESCR].‖330  From the standpoint of these 
multilateral instruments, it becomes increasingly clear that the goal 
of raising living standards is meant to address the needs of the 
impoverished such that the process of redistributing national income 
towards the less-fortunate is integral to this development need.   
From the Covered Agreements to other multilateral instruments as 
interpretative elements, the goal of raising living standards, with 
poverty reduction part and parcel, emerges as a goal that is consistent 
with WTO law.  The preambles of both the GATT and WTO 
Agreement set forth this goal as part of the object and purpose of the 
WTO.  GATT Articles XXXVI:1 and XVIII:1 further evidence this 
objective.  Taking the step to other multilateral instruments, Article 
55 of the UN Charter, Article 11 of the ICESCR, and Article 1(iii) of 
the World Bank Agreement each captures this goal and bolsters the 
legal link between raising living standards and poverty reduction.  
 
 327. GATT art. XXXVI:7. 
 328. UN Charter art. 55. 
 329. ICESCR, supra note 136, art. 11; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Why 
International Labor Standards?, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: 
GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 129, 157 (Robert J. Flanagan & 
William B. Gould IV eds., 2003). 
 330. ICESCR, supra note 136, arts. 11(2), 7(a)(ii). 
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This article thus submits that a measure advancing the goal of 
reducing poverty in a developing country promotes a development 
need within the contemplation of the WTO legal order.   
3. Sustainable Development as a Development Need 
The preamble of the WTO Agreement additionally recognizes the 
goal of sustainability, calling for ―the optimal use of the world‘s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development.‖331  Sustainable development, the concept of meeting 
present needs without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their needs,332 relies most importantly on environmental 
protection and conservation of resources.333  If resources are too 
rapidly depleted or utilized, the duration over which a nation can 
maintain economic processes dependent on that resource is limited, 
and the development is unsustainable.334  More particularly, GATT 
Article XX has allowed for environmental protection to be 
introduced into the WTO‘s institutional framework and dispute 
settlement process in relation to the goal of sustainable 
development.335   
The AB in both U.S. – Gasoline and U.S. – Shrimp found 
measures adopted by the U.S. that compromised the conservation of 
an ―exhaustible natural resource‖336 to be contrary to the chapeau of 
 
 331. WTO Agreement pmbl.; see also Daniel Bodansky & Jessica C. Lawrence, 
Trade and Environment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 505, 515 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009). 
 332. World Commission on Environment and Development, Report, 
Development and International Economic Co-operation: Environment, transmitted 
by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987) 
[hereinafter World Commission Report]. 
 333. Jeffrey Kenners, The Remodeled European Community GSP+: A Positive 
Response to the WTO Ruling?, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 292, 
295-96 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007); M.C.W. Pinto, 
The Legal Context: Concepts, Principles, Standards and Institutions, in 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 16, 16 (Friedl Weiss et al. 
eds., 1998); see generally World Commission Report, supra note 334. 
 334. Kysar, supra note 245, at 22-23. 
 335. GATT art. XX(b), (g); Bodansky & Lawrence, supra note 333, at 516; 
Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 172, at 1335-37. 
 336. See GATT art. XX(g). 
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Article XX.337  In economic theory, sustainability has routinely been 
discussed as essential to economic development.338  To the extent 
that a measure supports conservation of exhaustible resources, and 
thus, sustainable development, this article submits that the measure 
supports a ―development need‖ of developing countries consistent 
with the WTO legal framework.   
4. Education as a Development Need 
Education is not explicitly mentioned in the Covered Agreements 
as a means of promoting either macroeconomic growth or a better 
standard of living, but in light of multilateral instruments as 
interpretative elements,339 education is readily visible as an economic 
development need.  In both theory and empirical studies, enhanced 
education has been shown to lead to growth and specialization of an 
economy, and thus enhanced wage-earning potential for individuals 
and economic growth.340  Greater specialization and diversification 
of the economy is addressed as a means to achieving macroeconomic 
growth in the GATT,341 but including education as a development 
need requires the inferential step that education promotes this 
specialization and diversification.   
While a readily made inferential step in light of the economic 
theory and studies,342 inclusion of education as a development need 
from a legal standpoint is best appreciated in light of certain 
provisions in multilateral instruments.  Article 55 of the UN Charter 
 
 337. U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 219, at 19; U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 234, ¶ 
129. But see U.S. – Shrimp (Article 21.5–Malaysia), supra note 234, ¶¶ 134, 152-
53 (upholding the U.S. ban after negotiations proved fruitful); see also Bodansky 
& Lawrence, supra note 333, at 516. 
 338. HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 27–30 (1996); Kenners, supra note 335, at 295-96. 
 339. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 163 (allowing for such recourse). 
 340. See, e.g., Fan Zhai & Thomas W. Hertel, Impacts of the DDA on China: 
The Role of Labor Markets and Complementary Education Reforms, in POVERTY 
AND THE WTO: IMPACTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 285, 295-98 
(Thomas W. Hertel & L. Alan Winters eds., 2006). 
 341. GATT art. XXXVI:5 (―The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-
developed contracting parties will be facilitated by a diversification of the structure 
of their economies and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export of 
primary products.‖). 
 342. Zhai & Hertel, Impacts of the DDA on China, supra note 342, at 310-15. 
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states that the UN is designed to promote ―solutions of international 
economic, social, health, and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational cooperation,‖343 with all UN Member States 
undertaking to take action to achieve this goal.344  Article 13 of the 
ICESCR affirms the right of everyone to education.345  However, this 
provision alone in the ICESCR requires the deductive step that 
education is not simply a development need, for instance, of a social 
or cultural character,346 but rather is an economic development 
need.347  For this latter step, Article 6 of the ICESCR serves as the 
bridge, addressing the importance of training, technical, and 
vocational education in support of the right to work.348  Specifically, 
Article 6(2) provides that the right to work is fully realized through 
―training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady 
economic, social and cultural development.‖349  In light of these 
provisions, this article submits that the goal of providing education 
and training has consistently been recognized by states as an 
economic development need, and that programs, policies, and 
mechanisms that advance this goal promote a development need 
within the contemplation of the WTO legal order.   
C. SYNTHESIS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE WTO‘S OBJECT 
AND PURPOSE 
As the Appellate Body recognized, the object and purpose of the 
 
 343. U.N. Charter art. 55(b). 
 344. U.N. Charter art. 56. 
 345. ICESCR, supra note 136, art. 13(1). 
 346. See id. (providing that education enables ―all persons to participate 
effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the 
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.‖).  From this stand 
point, education can be viewed as a social or cultural need, but this provision of the 
ICESCR is notably silent on the economic benefits of education. 
 347. See AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 92 (recognizing that the objective and 
purpose of the Enabling Clause is to promote LDCs‘ economic development). 
 348. See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13: The Right to Education, ¶ 15, U.N. 
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 349. ICESCR, supra note 136, art. 6(2). 
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Enabling Clause is to promote economic development,350 and that of 
the WTO Agreement is to ensure that developing countries receive a 
share of international trade commensurate with their needs.351  Thus, 
any goals or needs promoted by the Enabling Clause and that fall 
within the WTO‘s ambit must necessarily relate to economic goals 
and needs.  Advocates of human rights protections and good 
governance as development needs within the WTO‘s contemplation 
face the uphill battle of relating these goals back to some driver of 
economic development.  As to goals such as poverty reduction, 
sustainable development, and education, beyond macroeconomic 
growth through increased market access, economic analysis readily 
demonstrates the impact of these pursuits on economic 
development.352  As a matter of law, this article has argued that these 
goals are just as much encapsulated in (1) the Covered Agreements 
and (2) related multilateral instruments that serve as interpretative 
elements of WTO-consistent rights and obligations.  Thus, measures 
conducive to these aims ―respond positively to the development, 
financial, and trade needs of developing countries.‖353   
CONCLUSION 
With an institution as powerful as the WTO that aims to promote 
economic development and has seen success towards this end, it goes 
without saying that developing countries will fight for a greater voice 
in this forum.  Observed with notable frequency in the Covered 
Agreements, the development needs of developing countries are 
singled out and given special attention.  The institution can leave it to 
the practice of nations to determine exactly what constitutes 
―development needs.‖  But the institutional goals of the WTO and its 
dispute settlement system to promote predictability and consistency 
would be well served by articulating these development, financial, 
and trade needs so that they may serve as bounds and guideposts for 
the practice of WTO Members.  To that end, this article sought to 
begin to spell out some of the prominent development needs 
 
 350. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶¶ 91-92. 
 351. AB Report, supra note 12, ¶ 168. 
 352. See supra notes 271-287, 341-351 and accompanying text. 
 353. Enabling Clause, supra note 10, at ¶ 3(c). 
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ingrained in the WTO legal framework.  The hope of this article is 
that through these four ―development needs‖ of market access, 
poverty reduction, sustainable development, and education, the 
overlapping coverage of economic, social, and human rights 
objectives espoused by WTO Members can be pursued in a manner 
consistent with WTO law.   
 
